Using Surveys of Business Perceptions as a Guide to Growth-Enhancing Fiscal Reforms by Misch, Florian et al.
Using Surveys of Business
Perceptions as a Guide to 
Growth-Enhancing Fiscal Reforms 
Florian Misch, Norman Gemmell and Richard Kneller
WORKING PAPER 04/2014
January 2014
Working Papers in Public Finance Chair in Public Finance Victoria Business School
The Working Papers in Public Finance series is published by the Victoria 
Business School to disseminate initial research on public finance topics, from 
economists, accountants, finance, law and tax specialists, to a wider audience. Any 
opinions and views expressed in these papers are those of the author(s). They should 
not be attributed to Victoria University of Wellington or the sponsors of the Chair in 
Public Finance. 
 
 
Further enquiries to: 
The Administrator 
Chair in Public Finance 
Victoria University of Wellington 
PO Box 600 
Wellington 6041 
New Zealand 
 
Phone: +64-4-463-9656 
Email: cpf-info@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Papers in the series can be downloaded from the following website: 
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/cpf/working-papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using Surveys of Business Perceptions as a
Guide to Growth-Enhancing Fiscal Reforms
Florian Mischa;, Norman Gemmellb;c;y and Richard Knellerb;z
aCentre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany
bSchool of Economics, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
cVictoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
Abstract
This paper assesses the merits of using business perceptions of
growth constraints as a guide to growth-enhancing scal policy re-
forms. Using endogenous growth models in which the government
levies an income tax to provide public inputs to the production of
private rms, the paper demonstrates that such perceptions of growth
constraints may be misleading from a policy perspective. In particu-
lar rms can be expected to systematically overestimate the growth-
enhancing e¤ects of lower tax rates relative to public services and pub-
lic capital, and underestimate the growth-enhancing e¤ects of greater
provision of public capital relative to taxation and public services. In
addition, we show that rms rank di¤erent public services and di¤er-
ent types of public capital according to the actual costs they impose
on rms. It is then shown that these theoretical predictions regarding
how rms rank constraints correspond closely to the observed ranking
of constraints by rms in the World Banks Enterprise Surveys.
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1 Introduction
The seminal contributions of Barro (1990) and Devarajan et al. (1996) pro-
vided the foundation for what has become a standardtheoretical framework
to analyze the impact of scal policy on long-run growth. Broadly, this in-
volves modelling the distortionary e¤ects of taxation via impacts on the pri-
vate marginal product of capital, and the productivity-enhancing e¤ects of
di¤erent types of public spending.1 Such models capture scal externalities
in the form of private rm-level productivity e¤ects from public spending
and the deadweight costs of taxation. While such frameworks are helpful for
thinking at a fairly high level about potential growth e¤ects of scal policy,
in practice, they provide only limited guidance to policy advisers seeking
to identify which particular scal reforms (changes in individual tax rates
or changes to specic categories of public spending for example) are likely
to be growth-enhancing or have the smallest/largest impact. Recently a re-
lated but largely separate strand of research has begun to focus on specic
policy-based and other constraints on growth; see, for example, Dixit (2007)
and Hausmann et al. (2008b) and Rodrik (2010). This conceptual growth
diagnosticapproach focuses on identifying the most binding constraints on
growth in practice and thereby goes beyond the more abstract predictions
and policy implications of highly stylized conceptual models.2 However, good
policy advice, in addition to requiring sound theoretical frameworks to iden-
tify growth-enhancing scal reforms, also needs a reliable evidence base. The
objective of this paper is therefore to examine whether, and when, subjective
perceptions of rms may be a useful source of information to help identify
growth-enhancing scal reforms.
Much of the evidence base for policy advice to promote growth has tra-
ditionally come from applications of econometric methods to various scal
aggregates. However, concerns have recently been raised over the merits of
1For recent contributions see, for example, Turnovsky (2004), Semmler et al. (2007),
Agénor (2008a), Agénor (2008b), Monteiro and Turnovsky (2008).
2This strand of the literature argues that removing the most binding constraint of an
economy has the largest growth e¤ects; Misch et al. (2010) show that this proposition is
indeed optimal under certain conditions in a more formal growth framework.
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this type of evidence for policy reform advice in practice; see, for example,
Carlin et al. (2010), Rodrik (2005), Hausmann et al. (2008a).
It seems appropriate therefore to question whether business perceptions,
such as those provided by the World Bank (World Bank Enterprise Surveys,
WBES), are a useful additional source of information to guide policy mak-
ers choices. These surveys contain ratings of various factors regarded as
obstaclesor constraintson rmsgrowth performance as identied by rm
owners or managers. With rms investment decisions likely to be an im-
portant driver of aggregate economic growth, and these investment decisions
likely to be a¤ected by rmsperceptions, such perception indicators could
potentially be a valuable source of information on actual growth constraints.
Recognizing the potential value of these data does not imply that these
data necessarily always provide useful information to policy makers, nor
that they should never be used. Rather, the appropriate balance between
such views should be based on a framework through which to interpret these
data. Indeed, a number of authors have recently argued over the merits of
such business survey information as a reliable identier of actual constraints,
and the policy reforms that might follow. We summarize that discussion in
the next section.
Our approach di¤ers from existing papers. We adopt the standard the-
oretical framework for the analysis of scal policy and long-run growth of
both the aggregate economy and a representative rm dating back to Barro
(1990). This allows us to demonstrate that rmsperceptions, in particular
the ranking of di¤erent scal policy-related constraints by the same rm,
can be expected to be misleading from a policy perspective in specic ways.
The essence of our argument is that, in part because of the way business
survey questions are constructed, rmsresponses are likely to focus on the
direct e¤ects of policies alleviating particular constraints that they see as ob-
stacles, while ignoring the externalities, or indirect e¤ects, of these policies.
Endogenous growth models with public nance involve a direct theoretical
counterpart to this: private agents ignore the externalities that arise via
the government budget constraint. For instance, they ignore positive exter-
nalities from private investment in the sense that increasing output raises
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public revenue which in turn gives rise to higher productive public spending.
We exploit this assumption to model rm perceptions of scal policy-related
constraints including taxation and public expenditures taking two di¤erent
forms: ows of public services and stocks of public capital.
The paper makes two contributions. The rst is to evaluate, based on a
class of endogenous growth models, whether business perception data could
be useful in identifying the optimal direction for scal policy reform. We
show that it is likely that rms perceive the (distortionary) tax rate as a more
severe constraint than public service-related constraints, which in turn are
likely to be perceived as more severe than public capital-related constraints.
Firms view scal constraints in this order even when taxes and spending are
set at their optimal, growth-maximizing values (i.e., where changes to any
scal parameters would result in declines of the growth rate). However, this
framework also predicts that for comparisons of scal constraints involving
similar types of public spending (between two public service-related, or two
public capital-related, spending categories for example), business perception
data do not su¤er from such systematic biases vis-à-vis optimal policy re-
sponses. Therefore, the perceived ranking of constraints may or may not be
correlated with the actual severity of constraints. We show that our conclu-
sions hold for a variety of model parameters such as those that determine
the rmsreliance on public services and public capital; we thereby take into
account that rms are heterogenous.
The second contribution is to compare actual business perception data
from theWorld Bank Enterprise Surveys, and in particular how rms rank s-
cal policy-related constraints, with the ranking predicted by the endogenous
scal-growth framework. The WBES, covering a wide range of businesses
in many countries, provides comprehensive information on how rms rate
alternative scal instruments in terms of the severity of the constraints im-
posed on their (growth) performance. We nd that the WBES rankings of
scal policy-related constraints closely match those predicted by the theoret-
ical models. While based on the data we cannot rule out that the observed
WBES ranking may in fact reect the actual severity of constraints, we nev-
ertheless argue that in the absence of the biases we identify in the model,
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such an average ranking would be unlikely to arise across a large number of
rms.
This framework is based on a restrictive set of assumptions. Neverthe-
less, we argue that it is particularly well suited to model and assess rms
perceptions of growth constraints, in part due to its simplicity and the re-
sulting clarity of the analysis. We show that these biases can be expected
to be important for the evaluation of some scal policy reform options, but
not for others. This suggests that it is important to distinguish between the
specic contexts in which such business perception information is likely to
o¤er reliable or unreliable guidance to growth-enhancing policy reforms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant liter-
ature. Sections 3 and 4 develop the models, derive the equilibrium of the
market economy, and identify the growth-maximizing policies. Section 5
models business perceptions, assesses their merits for policy making, and de-
rives theoretical predictions regarding rmsranking of scal policy-related
constraints. Section 6 tests the latter against the ranking of constraints by
rms in the WBES. Section 7 concludes.
2 Overview on the Use of Business Percep-
tions in the Literature
Since recently, an increasing number of papers recognizes or discusses the
potential merits of using business perceptions of the costs of obstacles for
policy analysis. Carlin et al. (2012) discuss the potential advantages of busi-
ness perception data compared to objective indicators at the aggregate level
in detail. First, they argue that business perceptions may provide more rele-
vant measures of infrastructure-related constraints. For example, transition
economies score relatively well in terms of physical indicators that measure
the extent of the railway network; however, such indicators poorly reect
the value of the rail network for the economy, if the railway was designed to
primarily serve large state-owned enterprises. Second, they also argue that
aggregate indicators give little if any clues about the relative importance
of constraints of rms. In principle, business perceptions facilitate the com-
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parison between the severity of di¤erent constraints such as the rule of law
and electricity supply for instance. While in this paper we argue that such
perceptions-based rankings may of course be misleading, objective indicators
are typically not comparable at all.
Hausmann et al. (2008a) provide an overview of the general principles
needed to identify the most binding constraint on the economy using di¤erent
sources of data including business perceptions. They suggest that a careful
use of such perception data is potentially helpful. Hallward-Driemeier and
Aterido (2009) nd that the ratings of a range of obstacles by rms corre-
late positively with objective measures of the same constraint; by contrast,
Clarke (2010) nds that the rating of specic obstacles is a¤ected by the
managers overall business condence undermining the potential value for
policy of business perceptions.
Carlin et al. (2006, 2010) are the only other existing papers that pro-
pose a framework through which business perceptions can be interpreted.
In their framework, rms assessments of various obstacles correspond to
the costs that they incur from these obstacles. Underlying this framework
is the assumption that private output is produced using private and public
inputs. Using this framework, they analyze the determinants of the rms
perceptions of obstacles; the key Carlin et al. result is that rms with higher
productivity tend to perceive a given obstacle as more severe compared to
rms with lower productivity that face the same obstacle. In addition, the
reported costs of a constraint vary with other rm-level characteristics which
determine the importance of various obstacles to a particular rm.
The implication of their framework is that perceptions of the same obsta-
cles across rms and countries cannot be readily compared. On the one hand,
di¤erences in terms of average productivity across countries mean that the
perceived costs of obstacles in richer countries are systematically higher even
if the level of provision was identical. On the other hand, such comparisons
are distorted by di¤erences in rm characteristics and sample compositions
across countries. However, cross-country comparisons are especially impor-
tant to uncover the relative importance of alternative obstacles to rms.
From a policy perspective, this is therefore unfortunate, as rm ratings
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of the same obstacle across countries potentially provide important insights.
In order to still draw sensible conclusions about the severity of constraints
in transition and non-transition economies from business perception data,
Carlin et al. (2012) proceed in two steps. In the rst step, they calculate
country-specic means of the perceived costs of each obstacle conditional
on the rm characteristics. In the second step, these conditional means are
regressed on GDP per capita to control for di¤erences in aggregate produc-
tivity that result in di¤erent valuations of the costs of obstacles to rms.
They also include a dummy which indicates whether the country in question
is a transition economy.
The results of their analysis indicate that there are systematic di¤erences
in terms of the types of obstacles which rms face between transition and
non-transition economies. They show that rms in transition countries are
more constrained by poorly functioning institutions such as customs and
courts, compared to non-transition economies. In addition, they show that
rms in poor transition economies are relatively less constrained by physical
infrastructure and access to skilled labor compared to rms in non-transition
economies.
3 The Modelling Framework
The public nance growth framework we adopt in the paper is an extension
of the well known model developed by Devarajan et al. (1996). We assume
that there is a large number of innitely lived households and a large number
of rms that are both normalized to one, that population growth is zero, and
that there is no entry or exit of rms.
Given that we are not analyzing interactions between rms and focus on
the ranking of di¤erent constraints by the same rm in subsequent sections,
we only consider a single representative rm. However, by considering the
robustness of the results under a variety of technology parameters, we account
for the fact that rms are heterogeneous. The representative rm produces
a single composite good using private capital (k) which is broadly dened to
encompass physical and human capital, and two public inputs, G1 and G2,
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based on Cobb-Douglas technology:
y = kG11 G
2
2 (1)
where  = 1   1   2. The productivity of private capital used by the
individual rm therefore positively depends on G1 and G2 which are provided
free of charge by the government at the point of consumption. For instance,
private vehicles can be used more productively when the quality of the road
network increases.3
G1 and G2 are delivered via two di¤erent productive public spending
categories, g1 and g2, and the government nances total public expenditure,
g1 + g2, by levying a at tax,  , on income. Thus the government budget,
which is assumed always to be balanced, is:
g1 + g2 = y (2)
Let 1 and 2 denote the share of the budget that is allocated to g1 and g2
so that
g1 = 1y (3)
g2 = 2y (4)
with 1 + 2 = 1.
The households own the rms and therefore receive all their output net
of taxation which they either reinvest in the rms to increase their capital
stock or which they use for consumption depending on their preferences and
the returns on private capital.4 Investment by the representative household
can therefore be written as
_k = (1  )y   c (5)
3Obviously, most public services and types of public capital are subject to congestion
which reduces the amount available to the individual rm. Given that modelling conges-
tion complicates the analysis considerably and may prevent long-run growth from arising,
we implicitly assume for simplicity, that G1 and G2 are non-rival and non-excludable.
However, our results would continue to hold with some congestion e¤ects.
4Alternatively, we could assume that rms and households are one entity commonly
referred to as household producers in the literature.
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The instantaneous utility function of the household is
u(c) =
c1 
1   (6)
We develop three versions of the model to understand the robustness
of the key result of the ranking of various scal policy constraints. These
accord with di¤erent views about whether the productive public inputs (G1
and G2) are stocks or ows. In particular, there has been some debate in
the literature regarding whether private output is likely to be a¤ected by the
ow of public services (miles of highway constructed per year for example) or
the stock of public capital (total miles of highway in existence).5 In Model
1, which coincides with the Devarajan et a. (1996) model,
G1;2 = g1;2 = 1;2y (7)
implying that G1 and G2 are two di¤erent productive public services which
are derived from the ow of public expenditure.
In the second version of the model referred to as Model 2, G1 denotes
public services as above so that
G1 = g1 = 1y (8)
whereas G2 denotes the stock of public capital implying that g2 represents
public investment:
_G2 = g2 = 2y (9)
This version corresponds to the model developed in Tsoukis and Miller (2003)
for example.
In the third version of the model referred to as Model 3, G1 and G2
represent two di¤erent types of public capital so that
_G1;2 = g2 = 1;2y (10)
As shown below, all results derived for Model 1 apply equally to Model 3.
Table 1 includes a summary of the key features of the models described above.
5See for example Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993).
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Table 1: Model summary
Model G1 G2
1 public service public service
2 public service public capital
3 public capital public capital
Alternatively, we could develop a single, more complex model with two types
of public services together with two types of public capital. However, this
would yield essentially the same insights compared to the use of the three
models, whilst making the model exposition harder to follow.
The assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology is convenient because it al-
lows for closed-form solutions of optimal policies as shown below, but ar-
guably, it may not be very realistic. In particular, factors of production may
be complements, in part because public inputs provided by the government
fundamentally di¤er from private inputs, such that it may be very costly
for rms to substitute for them. For example, poor performance of public
law enforcement may require rms to install costly security and property
protection systems. Therefore, in the Appendix, we show that the results
also hold for the more general case of CES technology when the elasticity of
substitution is smaller than one.
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility U given by
U =
Z 1
0
u(c(t))e tdt (11)
subject to the respective production function of the model as well as the
households resource constraint given by (5) taking the initial capital stock
k0 > 0 as well as  , G1 and G2 as given.6 The latter assumption, namely
that private agents take all aspects of scal policy as given, is crucial for
the remainder of the paper and directly follows from the fact that the model
economy is populated by a large number of rms and households. From the
rst-order conditions, the growth rate of the households consumption and
6The time subscript is omitted whenever possible. A dot over the variable denotes its
derivative with respect to time. In Models 2 and 3, the initial stock of public capital must
also be greater than zero.
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of the economy can be written in familiar form as
 =
_c
c
=
1

((1  )yk   ) (12)
The representative household computes the marginal product of private
capital (which represents the returns on private capital) from (1) while hold-
ing constant the quantity of public inputs to private production that the
representative rm it owns receives. Here we are assuming that when there
are a large number of tax-paying rms, the impact of raising the stock of the
private capital and output of an individual rm on the level of total public
spending is likely very small and can therefore safely be ignored. Hence, the
marginal product of private capital is
yk = 

G1
k
1 G2
k
2
(13)
so that from (12), the growth rate can be written as
 =
1


(1  )

G1
k
1 G2
k
2
  

(14)
In order to ensure that the transversality condition holds and does not con-
strain the choice of  and 1;2, it is assumed that  > 1.
7 In Model 1, there
are no transitional dynamics, and the economy is always on the balanced
growth path. The Appendix shows that the equilibrium of Models 2 and 3 is
saddlepoint stable within relevant parameter ranges, and that the balanced
growth path is unique. Along the balanced growth path, c, k, G1, G2 and y
all grow at the same rate. Obviously, in this class of models, long-run growth
at the aggregate level is a result of the nature of the rmsproduction func-
tion: the rmsoutput grows in the long-run due to constant returns to scale
in private capital and public inputs which expand in parallel to the rms
capital stock. The growth rate of the representative rm, _y
y
, in turn corre-
sponds to (12) and depends on the net return to private capital, (1   )yk,
and on the owners (i.e. the households) preferences represented by  and
.
7The transversality condition can be written as lim
t!1[k] = 0 where  is the costate
variable of the current-value Hamiltonian.
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4 Optimal Fiscal Policy
This section derives the growth-maximizing tax rate,  , and the growth-
maximizing share of public resources allocated to each public input to pri-
vate production (G1;2), 

1;2. These growth-maximizing policies provide the
benchmark against which business perceptions of policy are then compared
below. For simplicity, we assume that the objective of the government is to
maximize growth. We recognize that growth- and welfare-maximizing poli-
cies may di¤er in these models, although di¤erences in outcomes are often
relatively small as shown by Misch et al. (forthcoming). Firms only consider
growth outcomes; for that reason we leave the consideration of welfare maxi-
mization to future analysis. In order to nd the growth-maximizing policies,
G1;2
k
must be expressed in terms of the scal policy parameters in each model
version.
Model 1 (two public services)
Using (7) to substitute for G1;2 in (1) and rearranging yields
y
k
= 
1+2
 
1

1 
2

2 (15)
so that G1
k
and G2
k
can be written as
G1
k
= 
1

1 2

1 
2

2 (16)
G2
k
= 
1

1

1 
1 1

2 (17)
Using (16) and (17), the growth rate given by (14) can be re-written as
 =
1

((1  ) 1+2 
1

1 
2

2   ) (18)
Maximizing (18) with regard to  and 1 and taking into account that 2 =
1   1 yields the growth-maximizing tax rate,  , the growth-maximizing
share of public resources allocated to G1, 

1, and the growth-maximizing
share of public resources allocated to G2, (1  1):
  = 1 + 2 (19)
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1 =
1
1 + 2
(20)
2 =
2
1 + 2
(21)
Model 2 (public services and public capital stock)
Using the condition along the balanced growth path:
y = _y= (22)
to substitute for y in (9), and integrating, yields
G2 =
2

y (23)
Further, using (8) and (23) to substitute for G1 and G2, respectively, in (1),
and rearranging yields:
y
k
= 
1+2
 
1

1

2

2

(24)
Finally, using (24), (22), and (23) in combination with (14), it can then be
shown that the growth rate in Model 2 has to satisfy the following equation:
 =
1


(1  ) 1+2 
1

1

2

2
   

(25)
which di¤ers from Model 1 because  appears on the RHS. However, using
implicit di¤erentiation, it can be shown that the growth-maximizing tax rate
and the growth-maximizing spending share of G1,   and 

1, respectively,
are identical to Model 1 when Cobb-Douglas technology is assumed.
Model 3 (two public capital stocks)
In Model 3, G1 and G2 denote the stock of two di¤erent types of public
capital and can be expressed by analogy to (23) as:
Gi =
i

y (26)
such that the growth rate satises the following equation:
 =
1

 
(1  )  1+2

1

1


2

2

  
!
(27)
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The growth-maximizing policies can then be derived in a similar manner to
Model 2. With Cobb-Douglas technology, they are also identical to Model 1.
In all models,   and 1;2 can be considered as optimal policies in a situa-
tion where the government is unconstrained and maximizes growth. However,
governments are typically constrained in their ability to change various el-
ements of scal policy due to legal requirements or commitments such as
interest payments that depend on previous accumulated public debt, which
generate budget rigidities. More importantly, governments are inevitably
imperfectly informed about the production technology parameters required
to set  and 1;2 to their optimal values. Rather, governments generally face
the challenge of identifying growth-enhancing policy changes or reforms that
take existing policy as its starting point. The next section considers how far
business (rms) assessments of scal policy-related constraints to growth
can be expected to serve as a reliable guide to identify the direction of scal
policy parameter changes that enhance growth.
5 FirmsPerceptions of Constraints: Theo-
retical Predictions
5.1 Modelling Business Perceptions
This sub-section models business perceptions of scal policy-related con-
straints to growth, and in particular the ratings of obstacles provided by
rms in the Enterprise Surveys. This will allow us to assess whether the
scal policy adjustments they suggest raise or lower the long-run growth
rate and thereby align with the rst-best policy option chosen by a perfectly
informed government that maximizes the growth rate. As part of the Enter-
prise Surveys, business owners or top managers are typically asked: Please
tell us if any of the following issues are a problem for the operation and
growth of your business.Respondents were then asked to rate the severity
of each item on a ve-point scale.8 The list of items that rms are presented
8This is the question asked in the standard survey design which was used until 2005
and only in some surveys carried out in 2006. From 2006 onwards, depending on the
obstacle, various versions of questions were asked, but typically they all contain the word
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includes tax rates, various types of public service-related obstacles including
skills and education of available workers, crime, theft and disorder and, to a
lesser extent, tax administration, as well as transport which directly relates
to infrastructure as a type of public capital.
In our model, taxation  , and public services and public capital repre-
sented by G1 and/or G2 depending on the version of the model all a¤ect pri-
vate investment. Taxation crowds out investment, whereas the level of public
services and public capital are required for private production and raise the
returns to private investment. In this sense, we interpret taxation, public
services and public capital as constraints to rm-level investment which are
exogenous to the individual rm. In a dynamic setting, a natural measure
of the cost associated with each constraint is the increase in output growth
or investment growth (which coincide along the balanced growth path) as a
result of marginally alleviating them. This is also a natural way to model the
rmsassessment of the severity of these obstacles in the surveys because as
Carlin et al. (2010) argue, the questions asked in the surveys are implicitly
in relative terms, rather than in absolute, monetary terms. Considering the
change in the growth rate is a relative measure and therefore seems appro-
priate and also closely related to the terms used in the question.9
We further assume that rms take the public inputs to private produc-
tion, G1 and G2, as given. This assumption follows directly from the posi-
tive investment externality described above and thereby ensures consistency
because rms are also assumed to ignore these externalities when they com-
pute the returns on their investment. It is justied in the presence of a
large number of rms: individual rms are unlikely to internalize the posi-
obstacle. One commom question is: "As I list some of many factors that can a¤ect the
current operations of a business, please look at this card and tell me if you think that each
factor is No Obstacle, a Minor Obstacle, a Major Obstacle, or a Very Severe Obstacle to
the current operations of this establishment." Surveys in some countries may also di¤er
from the standard questionnaire design.
9We could also alternatively consider the increase in current output or lifetime utility
as a result of relaxing constraints. The di¤erent measures can yield di¤erent results,
especially where the models imply that growth- and welfare-maximizing policies di¤er. In
Model 1, for example, the growth- and welfare-maximizing scal policies coincide under
Cobb-Douglas technology because public capital is not included (see Futagami et al., 1993,
for comparison).
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tive externalities of private investment, where the latter arise because higher
levels of private output result in higher public revenue, which in turn enables
higher levels of productive public spending and thereby higher returns to
all rmsprivate capital. In addition, since the way the survey question is
framed makes no provision for the existence or the relevance of the govern-
ment budget constraint, it might be expected to encourage rms to ignore
the government budget constraint in the context of the survey.10 Finally, this
assumption is also consistent with the fact that the type of constraints that
rms are asked to assess are not equivalent to the policy parameters that the
government sets, namely  , 1 and 2. This assumption implies that business
respondents do not internalize the government budget constraint when they
are asked to rate scal policy-related constraints.
Below, we show that this assumption leads to a potential bias in business
perceptions from a policy perspective. Obviously, if the government charged
prices for the use of public services and public capital, then rms would
internalize the externalities associated with their provision. This would imply
that taxation is no longer necessary, and that this type of bias in the rms
assessment of the costs of underprovision of public services and public capital
would not arise. However, in practice, it is not always feasible to charge user
prices, especially, if the public good in question is non-excludable, and, if
it is, then prices are often not high enough to ensure full cost-recovery for
political reasons, especially in developing countries.
We therefore model the rmsassessments of the severity of taxation and
underprovision of public services and public capital as the change in the
growth rate that the representative rm expects as a result of raising G1 and
G2 and lowering  . We therefore use the derivatives of the growth rate with
respect to G1, G2 and  (denoted by B1 , 
B
2 , and 
B
 , respectively) as simple
10Though this assumption seems reasonable in the context of responses to business
surveys questions, the political economy literature assessing individualsor votersscal
policy preferences has egun to examine the case where they recognize the government
budget constraint; see, for example, Creedy (2008).
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measures of the rmsrating of the severity of the constraints; hence:11
B1;2 =
@
@G1;2
(28)
B =  
@
@
(29)
where, based on our assumptions, rms perceive the growth rate, B, as:
B =
1


(1  )

G1
k
1 G2
k
2
  

(30)
which corresponds to (14).
Our framework to model and interpret business perceptions is similar
to the framework proposed by Carlin et al. (2006, 2010). We also assume
that various public services and types of infrastructure are inputs to private
production. In addition, in the Carlin et al. framework, the rmsassessment
of the severity of constraints is modelled as the loss in output that arises
relative to an ideal situation where the obstacle is absent. As Carlin et
al. (2012) note, for small changes in the severity of the constraint, their
expression is the rst derivative of the output / prot function which is very
similar to our approach.
However, we nevertheless extend their framework in several ways. First,
we model the di¤erences of various obstacles in greater detail. On the one
hand, we explicitly include tax rates in the model. On the other hand,
by using a dynamic model, we are able to capture the di¤erences between
public services derived from the ow of public spending and the benets
derived from the stock of public capital accumulated over time. Second, we
use a general equilibrium framework by considering the government budget
constraint. This is important, given that removing obstacles is typically
associated with some type of costs and therefore gives rise to trade-o¤s.
Both features of our model are critical for our analysis.
11When we compute the partial derivatives, we implicitely ignore the subsequent change
in the capital stock that is a consequence of the second-order response to a change in the
change of the capital stock (i.e. a change in the rate of investment). These e¤ects are
likely to be small and qualitatively unimportant for our results.
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5.2 Assessing Business Perceptions
Business perceptions of constraints can be assessed by evaluating the pre-
ferred scal policies they imply. If, for instance, B1 > 0, then business
perceptions imply that increasing 1 or  , in order to raise G1, has a positive
e¤ect on the growth rate. Note that B is dened above as the negative of
@B
@
, such that if B > 0, businesses perceive that lowering  has a positive
e¤ect on the growth rate. Clearly then, business perceptions will suggest
the direction of the appropriate policy response, but will not indicate the
magnitude of the change necessary to reach the growth-maximizing point.
While this is a limitation of the information that can be gained from business
perception data compared to that found from calculating where the growth-
maximizing point lies, in practice, budget rigidities and other information
limitations often mean that scal policy adjustments require recognizing the
correct direction, rather than end-point, of reform.
When all scal policy parameters are set at their growth-maximizing lev-
els then, in the absence of any systematic bias, rms should perceive none
of the constraints as binding, that is: B1;2 = 0 and 
B
 = 0. However, it
is obvious from equation (30) that rms always perceive that B1;2 > 0 and
B > 0 so that the policy suggestions arising from business perceptions may
conict with correctrst-best policy advice. Other things equal, rms al-
ways want more spending on productive public inputs and lower taxation.12
The truee¤ects of changing 1;2 or  obviously depend on whether their
current values are at, below, or above their growth-maximizing values, 1;2
and  . The source of this systematic bias of business perceptions from a
policy perspective relates to our assumption that rms ignore the govern-
ment budget constraint: rms do not consider the negative e¤ects (positive
e¤ects) of lowering taxes in terms of lower productive public spending (or
increasing spending on public services and public capital in terms of higher
taxation). From the models, this is not surprising, given that the expression
for the perceived growth rate (30) di¤ers from the growth rates in the three
12The only exception is of course the unrealisitc case when  = 0 so that  = 0 or
when G1 and G2 are so large so that B1;2  0. Alternatively, B1;2  0 when 1 and 2
are very small.
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models considered as assessed by a perfectly informed government - in (18),
(25) and (27). By contrast, a fully informed government essentially assesses
the severity of constraints associated with scal policy by computing the
rst derivatives of (18), (25) and (27), depending on the model, with respect
to  , 1 and 2. Where policy parameters are already set at their growth-
maximizing levels, a fully informed government would not perceive them as
binding, so that @=@1;2 = @=@ = 0.
Comparing the optimal, i.e. rst-best policy choices, with those suggested
by business perceptions is in essence an analogy to comparisons between in-
vestment decisions taken by a central planner and by private agents in a
decentralized economy. In both cases, di¤erences arise because of positive in-
vestment externalities that are ignored by private agents: private investment
raises the stock of private capital resulting in higher output and therefore
higher public revenue. Given that the government budget is always assumed
to be balanced, increased public revenue leads to higher levels of productive
public expenditure which in turn increases private productivity. Ignoring
this externality obviously distorts private investment.
We now attempt to correct business perceptions for this bias: instead of
considering business perceptions in absolute terms, the policy implications of
business perceptions are instead evaluated in relative terms; i.e. we compare
perceptions of di¤erent obstacles, by the same rm. If constraint i is per-
ceived as more binding than constraint j (so that 
B
i
Bj
> 1 with i; j = 1; 2; 
and i 6= j), the policy implication is that removing constraint i raises the
growth rate whereas alleviating constraint j enhances the growth rate less
or may even lower the growth rate. The underlying rationale is that this
may cancel outthe systematic bias due to ignoring the government budget
constraint inherent in the perception of all obstacles. In particular, ignor-
ing the government budget constraint essentially implies that rms ignore
the indirect e¤ects of alleviating scal policy constraints. In principle, if the
indirect e¤ects are approximately similar or are alternatively negatively cor-
related with the direct growth e¤ects that result from alleviating constraints
and that rms perceive (so that the observed direct e¤ects are su¢ cient to
determine the ranking of the constraints), this is a useful strategy. However,
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we show in subsequent sub-sections that while our strategy to correct for the
bias of business perceptions proves successful for similar types of constraints,
some systematic bias may remain when di¤erent types of constraints are
compared.
5.3 FirmsComparisons of Di¤erent Types of Public
Services or of Public Capital
We rst turn to successful cases and evaluate the policy implications of
business perceptions of similar public spending-related constraints in relation
to each other in Model 1 (two di¤erent public services) and in Model 3 (two
di¤erent types of public capital). From (28), 
B
1
B2
can be written as
B1
B2
=
G21
G12
(31)
A comparison of the perceptions of two types public services or two types of
public capital eliminates the potential bias inherent in subjective rm data
from a policy perspective due to the rms ignoring the government budget
constraint. To show this, we use (7) for the case of two public services (Model
1) and (26) for the case of two types of public capital (Model 2) to re-write
(31) as
B1
B2
=
1(1  1)
21
(32)
For the case where spending shares are set at the growth maximum (1 = 

1),
it can be shown that:
B1
B2
= 1 (33)
That is, rms perceive both constraints as equally binding when the alloca-
tion is growth-maximizing in Models 1 and 3. If, on the other hand, 1 < 

1,
then 
B
1
B2
> 1 which suggests that G1 is a greater constraint than G2 (or vice
versa). The conclusion from business perceptions would be to increase 1
which is obviously growth-enhancing, irrespective of the parameter values of
the model. In this case, rm perceptions always align with that which would
be suggested by a fully-informed government and therefore business percep-
tions are of value in this regard and the perceived ranking is correlated with
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the actual ranking of growth constraints. Here, the strategy to eliminate the
bias inherent in business perceptions from a policy perspective by considering
them in relative terms is hence successful. This analysis also shows that 
B
1
B2
is determined by actual public spending allocation so that the ranking of two
public service- or two public capital-related constraints di¤ers by context.13
5.4 FirmsComparisons of Public Services and Public
Capital
This sub-section evaluates the policy implications of business perceptions of
the public spending-related constraints in relation to each other in Model 2
(one public service and one type of public capital). In this case, comparing
the perceptions of both types of constraints fails to correct the bias in busi-
ness perceptions. The intuition is that public capital is accumulated over
time and grows even in the absence of scal policy adjustments. By ignor-
ing the government budget constraint, rms do not take into account these
di¤erences.
To show this formally, we substitute for G1 and G2 in (31) using (7) and
(26):
B1
B2
=
1(1  1)
21
(34)
That is, compared to (32), in Model 2  is added to the denominator of
(34). In this model there is no closed-form solution of , so that (34) cannot
be evaluated analytically. However, using numerical examples, it can be
shown that in most instances, the policy preferences arising from business
perceptions in this case can be expected to be growth-reducing. Suppose for
instance 1 = 2 and 1 = 

1 = 0:5: Given that  < 1, it can be seen that in
this case, 
B
1
B2
> 1. This falsely suggests that the government should increase
1 further above its growth-maximizing value 

1. The Appendix provides
additional numerical examples with CES production technology that give
rise to the same result.
13Using numerical examples, the Appendix shows that these results continue to hold
when the elasticity of substitution between private and public inputs is smaller than in
the case of Cobb-Douglas technology.
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Using numerical examples, it is also possible to assess the likelihood that
rms perceive public services as a greater constraint than public capital and
vice versa by determining where in the scal policy space 1
2
> 1. The scal
policy space is dened in terms of all possible combinations of both scal
policy parameters,  and , within certain ranges. Figure 1 displays the
scal policy space for di¤erent exogenous parameter values. It is assumed
that 0:05  1  0:95 and that 0:05    0:94. The region where 
B
1
B2
<
1 is shaded, whereas in the remainder of the policy space, 
B
1
B2
> 1. The
likelihood can be assessed in terms of the combinations of  and  where
B1
B2
> 1 and 
B
1
B2
< 1, respectively, and then corresponds to the share of
the policy space where 
B
1
B2
> 1 which has been approximated numerically.14
Figure 1 shows that the likelihood that rms perceive public service-related
constraints as more severe than public capital-related constraints is relatively
high, and in relative terms, the share of instances where this is the case is
signicantly greater than 0.5. This holds even though the output elasticity
of public capital, 2, is three times larger than the output elasticity of public
services, 1, in our simulation.15 While these numerical simulations cannot
be regarded as representative, they nevertheless demonstrate that in many
cases, it can be expected that 1
2
> 1 except for relatively high values of 1.
Now suppose the opposite (and unlikely) case, namely that
B1
B2
< 1 (35)
implying that rms perceive G2 (public capital) as more binding than G1
(public service). From (34), this implies that
1(1  1)
21
< 1 (36)
Rearranging (36) yields
1 >
1
1 + 2
(37)
14The area where 
B
1
B2
> 1 can be approximated by using the Trapezoidal Rule with an
interval length of 0:001 and then divided by the total area of the policy space.
15When considering scal policy changes around the growth-maximizing values, it is
even more unlikely that 
B
1
B2
< 1.
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From (28) and (29), 
B

Bi
with i = 1; 2 can be written as
B
Bi
=
Gi
(1  )i (39)
This clearly illustrates the problem of comparing the perceptions of the tax-
related and the public services-related constraints: the comparison is es-
sentially between the growth e¤ects of an increase in the tax rate by one
percentage point with those resulting from an increase in Gi by one unit. As
we model the responses of rms in existing business surveys and have to take
the questionnaire design as given, normalizing the constraints and measuring
them on identical scales as done in Misch et al. (2010) and then asking rms
to assess their severity is desirable but not feasible for us.
In order to more rigorously evaluate the merits of this comparison, we
substitute for Gi using (7) according to which Gi = iy:
B
Bi
=
i
(1  )iy (40)
Suppose that the level of taxation is set at the growth-maximizing level
( =  ), but that the public resource allocation is suboptimal such that
i =
1
2
i . It is clear that in this case, raising i and keeping  constant
would be growth-enhancing. However, according to the business perception
B
Bi
> 1 (41)
if
y >
(1  )i
i
(42)
This condition is likely to hold true within endogenous growth models re-
gardless of the composition of public spending and the level of taxation and
regardless of the unit of measurement of y because y (which constantly grows)
is on the LHS. As a result, it is uncertain whether 
B

Bi
provides the correct
(rst-best) policy prescriptions. Business perceptions of the appropriate pol-
icy response, to lower taxation, may match the rst-best policy prescription,
but rms support this policy response even when it is not optimal. Separat-
ing the occasions in which rm perceptions are correct and when they are
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incorrect is not possible in this case; hence perception data are not a reliable
guide to policy when B > 
B
i .
Given that comparing the tax- and the public services-related constraints
to correct for the bias in business perceptions which arises from a policy
perspective is not feasible due to di¤erences in measurement, an obvious
alternative would be to use business perceptions to compute perceived growth
elasticities with respect to  and Gi because elasticities are unit-free. Using
(29), (28), and (39) to compute the perceived growth elasticities and dividing
yields
B
Bi



Gi
=

(1  )i (43)
When the level of taxation is set at the growth-maximizing level ( =  ),
(43) can be rewritten as
1
(1  i) > 0 (44)
which is again greater than zero falsely suggesting that lowering taxation
raises the growth rate. The bias which arises from a policy perspective
therefore remains even in case when perceived elasticities are compared. This
implies that the underlying source of the bias is therefore primarily related
to rms ignoring the government budget constraint which cannot be cor-
rected by considering business perceptions relative to each other when the
constraints are measured on di¤erent scales.
Now again suppose the opposite (and unlikely) case, namely that
B
Bi
< 1 (45)
so that
y <
(1  )i
i
(46)
Rearranging (46) yields
 <
i
iy + i
(47)
In turn, if the RHS of (47) is smaller than   so that
i
iy + i
<   (48)
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then  <  . Provided that   is not extremely small, (48) is likely to hold
if 
B

Bi
< 1. The reason is that the LHS of (48) is decreasing over time (since
y which grows indenitely is in the denominator). (48) together with (47)
then implies that  <   is likely. Rearranging (46) yields
i <
(1  )i
y
(49)
Again, provided that i is not extremely small, the RHS of (49) is likely
smaller than i since y, which grows over time, is in the denominator so that
(1  )i
y
< i (50)
Therefore, if 
B

Bi
< 1, i < 

i . In other words, the policy implications
of 
B

Bi
< 1 (i.e. rms perceive that Gi is a greater constraint than ) are
likely to be growth-enhancing in most cases. If public services are ranked
as a more severe constraint than taxation, the business perception of the
appropriate policy response is identical to the one suggested by a perfectly
informed government which maximizes growth. Business perception data
contain therefore useful information when B < 
B
i . All results presented
here also hold for Models 2 and 3.
5.6 Summary
Table 2 summarizes the assessment of business perceptions of di¤erent con-
straints in relative terms across all models and shows in which cases imper-
fectly informed governments may regard them as consistent with rst-best
advice. Perceptions-based rankings of similar types of constraints (i.e. di¤er-
ent public services or di¤erent types of public capital) give growth-enhancing
policy suggestions, whereas perceptions-based rankings of di¤erent types of
constraints (tax-related constraints and public spending-related constraints,
or public service-related constraints and public capital-related constraints)
may give rise to growth-reducing policy suggestions depending on how rms
rank them.
The last column of Table 2 summarizes the key predictions regarding how
rms rank constraints. In summary, it is likely that rms perceive the tax-
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related constraint as more binding than public service-related constraints,
which, in turn, are perceived as more binding than public capital-related
constraints (B > 
B
ps > 
B
pc). Firms perceive the tax rate as a more severe
constraint than public spending-related constraints because whereas public
services and public capital enter the expression of the growth rate (14) as
absolute values, the tax rate enters (14) as a relative value (i.e. from (2),
 = (g1 + g2)=y). The intuition to explain the prediction that rms perceive
public service-related constraints as more binding than public capital-related
constraints is that public capital grows over time so that the stock of public
capital will typically be larger than the ow of public services (i.e. G2 > G1
in Model 2). With decreasing marginal returns and when G2 > G1, it is
therefore clear that Bps > 
B
pc.
Business perceptions may have misleading policy implications because
rms ignore the government budget constraint. In contrast, no specic pre-
dictions can be made about the relation between two public service-related
constraints and two public capital-related constraints. Table 2 shows, for
example, that the likelihood of rms falsely ranking tax constraints as a
greater growth constraint than public service or public capital constraints,
is high. At the same time, in the unlikely case that rms perceive public
services or public capital as a greater constraint than the tax rate, the policy
implications of the rmsranking are likely correct(i.e. growth-enhancing).
6 FirmsRanking of Constraints: Empirical
Observations
This section compares the theoretical predictions of how rms rank scal
policy-related constraints with the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to identify
the extent to which these data contain information of use to policy makers.
This allows us to assess whether the systematic bias in the ranking of growth
constraints by the same rm appears to be present in the data. The WBES
dataset we use is based on cross-section, rm-level data that covers 118,933
rms in 139 countries. We exclude rms that do not rate any of the obstacles
we consider. Each of the countries included in the dataset was surveyed up
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Table 2: Evaluation of business perceptions and model predictions with re-
spect to the ranking of constraints
Model Constraint i Constraint j Firms Policy impli- Ranking
ranking cation of likelihood
of i and j ranking
1,2 tax public service Bi > 
B
j possibly false* high
Bi < 
B
j correct** low
2,3 tax public capital Bi > 
B
j possibly false* high
Bi < 
B
j correct** low
1 public service public service Bi > 
B
j correct policy dependent
Bi < 
B
j correct policy dependent
2 public service public capital Bi > 
B
j possibly false*** high
Bi < 
B
j correct low
3 public capital public capital Bi > 
B
j correct policy dependent
Bi < 
B
j correct policy dependent
* assumes that (42) holds; ** assumes that (48)
and (50) hold; *** for most plausible numerical values
(Model 1: two public services; Model 2: one public service and one type of
public capital; Model 3: two types of public capital)
to ve times between 2002 and 2013 giving a total of 268 di¤erent surveys.16
The Enterprise Surveys provide a potentially useful testing ground against
which the model predictions with respect to the behavior of private agents can
be compared. The data includes a subjective rating of di¤erent scal policy-
related constraints: rm representatives were presented a list of obstacles
which they had to evaluate on a scale that ranges from 0 (no obstacle) to 4
(very severe obstacle). Some of the items in the list of obstacles are closely
related to scal policy. They include transportation, skills and education of
available workers, crime, theft and disorder, tax rates, and, to a lesser extent,
16The data was downloaded from www.enterprisesurveys.org on October 2nd 2013. It
should be noted that apart from the World Bank, other organizations are also involved in
providing the data. The Enterprise Surveys implemented in Eastern Europe and Central
Asian countries are also known as Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Surveys (BEEPS) and are jointly conducted by the World Bank and the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development. Enterprise Surveys in Latin America are jointly
funded with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and surveys in the Caribbean
are jointly funded with IDB and COMPETE Caribbean. Enterprise Surveys in South Asia
are jointly funded with the UKs Department for International Development (DFID).
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tax administration. Governments undertake public investment to built up
transportation infrastructure.
Recurrent public spending to provide public services in the education sec-
tor determines to a considerable extent the skills and the education level of
available workers17, and law enforcement by public agencies (which likewise
requires especially recurrent spending and only to a lesser extent public in-
vestment) determines crime rates. The quality of the tax administration de-
pends to some extent on recurrent public spending, but other factors are also
likely to play an important role. In the models, transportation infrastructure
which requires relatively little recurrent spending and depreciates very slowly
is represented by public capital. Education services, law enforcement and
to a lesser extent tax administration may be represented by public services
which both require a large share of recurrent public spending. Obviously, the
WBES does not contain actual information on deviations of scal policy from
the growth-maximizing level of taxation, public services and public capital.
We turn to this issue at the end of this section.
By contrast, we exclude electricity which is also included in the list of
obstacles presented to the interviewees. While in some countries, the gov-
ernment builds up electricity generation capacity using public revenue, the
role of the government is typically more that of a regulator, and electricity
providers are often semi-autonomous entities. Moreover, rms are charged
for electricity usage, and the prices of electricity typically correspond much
more to the actual cost of electricity generation and provision compared to
prices charged for the provision of other public services, if any. By contrast,
in our framework, we assume that rms may access public services and use
public capital free of charge so that it is not straight forward to extend our
analysis to the rmsperceptions of electricity. In addition, whether elec-
tricity is a major obstacle is also to a larger extent determined by exogenous
shocks such as droughts than in the cases of the other obstacles. For these
reasons, we do not consider electricity generation capacity as a scal policy
related obstacle which could be adequately modelled in our framework.
17We assume that the evaluation of the skills of available workers includes an implicit
evaluation of public education services.
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In general, there are several di¢ culties involved in the use of subjective
data including the reference point bias (i.e. respondents may use di¤erent
benchmarks against which obstacles are assessed), di¤erences in the over-
all tendencies to complain, and the performance bias (i.e. whether ratings
actually reect the rms performance in the environment rather than the
environment in which it operates) (Hallward-Driemeier and Aterido, 2009,
and Clarke, 2010). We address these concerns in two ways. First, we divide
the rating of the obstacles of every rm by the mean rating of all obstacles we
consider by the same rm. Second, we do not analyze the ratings in absolute
terms, but only consider their ranking, i.e., the rating in relative terms.
The converted mean ratings across all rms and countries are displayed in
Figure 2. As anticipated by the model it shows that transport is ranked lower
than constraints that require a relatively high share of recurrent spending in
order to be alleviated (education, crime and tax administration) which in
turn are ranked lower than tax rates. Note also that the three public service
categories are rated similarly.
While the mean rankings suggest that taxation is usually ranked as the
most severe obstacle to growth of the six considered, of greater interest is the
distribution of mean rankings across countries. Figure 3 compares the av-
erage ranking of the ve scal policy-dependent constraints (transportation,
crime, education, tax administration and tax rates). It shows that in almost
60 percent of the countries, tax rates are ranked rst, and in over 50 percent
of the countries, transport is ranked last. In contrast, there are only a few
countries where tax rates are among the three least important obstacles, and
transportation is rarely ranked among the rst three obstacles. It can also
be seen that, as we would predict, there is no clear rank order between the
public service-related constraints: education, crime and tax administration.
Note that to compile the underlying data for Figure 2, we have pooled data
from all surveys available for a given country.
Carlin et al. (2010) also report that tax rates are typically rated as
the most severe obstacle in most countries. Based on the endogenous growth
models considered above we anticipated that the tax-related constraint would
be perceived as more binding than the public service-related constraints
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Figure 2: Mean business perception of scal policy-related obstacles
Figure 3: Ranking of scal policy-dependent constraints by country
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(crime and disorder, education and skills), which, in turn, would be per-
ceived as more binding than public capital-related constraints (transporta-
tion). Figures 2 and 3 show that on average, the observed patterns follow
these predictions, and it is likely that these patterns are not mainly driven
by actual scal policies but rather by a bias in the perception of rms. For
these observations the model suggests that there is little reliable information
for policy makers. There are however a su¢ ciently large number of occasions
in which scal constraints are not in that order to suggest that there is some
information within the data. At the simplest level there are for example
around 40 percent of countries in which taxation is not ranked as the most
severe constraint. Or focusing on transportation which is closely related to
the stock of public capital, in roughly 50 percent of countries, this is not
ranked as the least important obstacle on growth. The model also suggests
that the rankings across di¤erent types of public service or di¤erent types of
public capital are informative.
Given that we are only able to assess the rms ranking based on the
model predictions but not based on objective data on deviations of actual
scal policy parameters from their growth-maximizing values, we cannot
fully rule out that the observed average ranking pattern is driven by the
actual severity of constraints. However, this seems unrealistic: on the one
hand, if one assumes for simplicity and in the absence of other information
that the severity of constraints is equally distributed across constraints (i.e.
that on average, the severity of each constraint is identical), such a ranking
would not emerge. On the other hand, many policy documents, for instance
by international development banks, routinely identify infrastructure as a
bottleneck to economic growth, or recommend increasing infrastructure in-
vestment. Assuming that on average, this analysis is correct, rms should
perceive transport infrastructure as a much more severe constraint if their
views were unbiased. However, this is not the case, which makes us condent
that our model-based conclusions are correct.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has modelled business perceptions of alternative scal policy-
related growth constraints using an endogenous growth model with public
nance. It has then considered the merits of these perceptions as a guide for
policy making in practice, and compared the ranking of constraints by rms
in the World Banks Enterprise Surveys with the predictions of the model.
The models demonstrate that a carefuluse of business perceptions of dif-
ferent constraints relative to each other to identify growth-enhancing scal
policy reforms is possible. According to the endogenous growth framework,
business perceptions are not useful to infer the optimal level, optimal compo-
sition and optimal magnitude of policy adjustments. However, due to various
budget rigidities, it is the direction of the policy change which is often most
important for policy in practice. In this case, business perceptions can pro-
vide some useful information.
The models examined suggest that rms may be expected to be better
at distinguishing the growth-enhancing or retarding e¤ects of similar public
spending categories (di¤erent public services or di¤erent types of public cap-
ital). However, the models demonstrate that business perceptions may be
misleading when rms are asked to compare taxes, public services and public
capital with each other. They may be misleading in the sense that the scal
policy prescriptions these perceptions imply need not be growth-enhancing in
the long run. One exception is that the policy implications from the compari-
son of di¤erent aspects of scal policy are likely to be growth-enhancing when
they are ranked contrary to the general prediction that taxes are ranked as
a more severe constraint than public expenditures, and that public services
are likely to be ranked as more severe than public capital.
The theoretical predictions regarding how rms are most likely to rank
scal policy-related constraints appear to correspond fairly well to empirical
observations. While we cannot directly observe the actual ranking of con-
straints, and are therefore unable to compare this to the perceived ranking,
we argue that it is likely that the overall pattern we observe is driven by
the biases which arise from a policy perspective and which we identify in
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our models. When constraints are ranked according to the predictions of
the model, business perceptions are not reliable for policy analysis. However
there is a su¢ ciently large number of observations for which the model sug-
gests that business perceptions are a useful guide. Therefore, the analysis
implies that business perceptions sometimes contain useful information.
The results of this paper may also help to interpret ndings of empiri-
cal papers that use business perception data as explanatory variables. For
instance, Balchin and Edwards (2008) nd that business perceptions of in-
frastructure are mostly not a signicant determinants of export participation
even though they nd that objective infrastructure indicators are signicant
to some extent. Our results suggest that those ndings are not surprising
because on average, and in comparisons to other constraints, rms do not
perceive infrastructure as an important obstacle irrespective of the actual
contribution of the infrastructure.
The results here also suggest possible options for the re-design of invest-
ment climate surveys. In particular, they suggest that the rmsmay rank
tax-related constraints excessively highly. In addition, they suggest that it
would be useful to ask rms to compare di¤erent types of public capital,
and, in a separate question, asking rms to compare di¤erent types of public
services. This would provide rms with a more rened list of obstacles, and
make their resulting comparisons more meaningful.
Our results have been derived within the standard modelling framework
we use and the assumptions upon which it is based. One implication of
this framework is that rms do not learn from past mistakes and revise
their perceptions accordingly. Nevertheless, this may correspond to rm
behavior in practice since learningwould require rms to systematically
record their perceptions and scal policy changes and compare them to their
own growth and investment behavior. Such learning seems unlikely, at least
systematically, since this would entail some cost but with no benets in terms
of better rm performance.
While we recognize that alternative frameworks to interpret business per-
ceptions data may be available, we believe that endogenous growth models
with public nance are a natural frameworkto provide rst steps to un-
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derstand the value of perception data. Establishing the robustness of those
conclusions to alternative frameworks is an obvious next step. The models ex-
amined here, when compared observed with business perceptions, are limited
to relatively simple public service/capital distinctions and the channels by
which they impact on growth. Possible extensions could for instance include
adding further channels that a¤ect the growth-maximizing scal policy.
We have shown that business perceptions in absolute terms do not contain
useful information for governments. However, we have compared the rating of
di¤erent constraints by a single rm and have shown that such a ranking may
be useful for governments. Future research could therefore usefully discuss
other types of comparisons. For instance, our framework could be used to
compare the rating of the same constraint across rms in di¤erent sectors or
countries more in the spirit of Carlin et al. (2010). This would require models
with at least two sectors of production that are a¤ected by productive public
services as in Monteiro and Turnovsky (2008). A nal extension would be
to include other types of business perceptions in the discussion which would
require a more complex modelling framework.
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A Appendix
A.1 The Models with CES technology
With CES technology, the production function is
y = (k + 1G

1 + 2G

2)
1
 (A.1)
where , 1 and 2 are share parameters with  = 1 1 2. The elasticity
of substitution, s, is determined by :
s =
1
1   (A.2)
With  = 0, the production technology is Cobb-Douglas. To capture the
notion that factors of production are complements rather than substitutes,
it is assumed that   0.
A.2 Uniqueness and Stability in Model 2 with CES
Technology
Let x = c
k
and z = G2
k
. Together with the transversality condition, lim
t!1
[k] =
0, and with the initial conditions, x0 > 0 and z0 > 0, the dynamics of the
market economy can be expressed as a system of two di¤erential equations:
_x
x
=
_c
c
 
_k
k
(A.3)
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and
_z
z
=
_G2
G2
 
_k
k
(A.4)
From (12), (5) and (9), respectively,
_c
c
=
1

((1  )yk   ) (A.5)
_k
k
= (1  )y
k
  x (A.6)
_G2
G2
= 2
y
G2
(A.7)
Setting _x
x
= 0 in (A.3) and solving for x yields its steady state value, ~x:
~x = (1  )y
k
  1

((1  )yk   ) (A.8)
Using (A.8) to substitute for x in (A.6), and using (A.6) and (A.7) to sub-
stitute for ( _k
k
) and ( _G2
G2
) in (A.4) yields
F = 2
y
G2
  1

(1  )yk + 

(A.9)
where F is a function. From (8) and (23),
G1
G2
=
1
2
 (A.10)
From (A.1) and (A.10),
y
G2
= (z  + 1

1
2


+ 2)
1
 (A.11)
Di¤erentiating (A.1) for k, using (8) to substitute for G1 and replacing G2k
by z yields
yk =

 + 1

1
y
k

+ 2z

 1

 1
 (A.12)
From (1) and (8),
y
k
=

 + 2z

(1  11)
 1

(A.13)
After using (A.13) to substitute in (A.12), and (A.11) and (A.12) to sub-
stitute in (A.9), it can be seen that if   0, dF
dz
< 0 implying that F is
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a monotonically decreasing function of z so that there is a unique positive
value of ~z that satises F = 0. From (A.8), there is a unique positive value
of ~x as well. Thus, the growth path is unique.
To investigate the dynamics in the vicinity of the unique steady state
equilibrium, equations (A.3) and (A.4) can be linearized to yield
_x
_z

=

a11 a12
a21 a22
 
x  ~x
z   ~z

(A.14)
where ~x and ~z denote the steady state values of x and z. From (A.3) and
(A.4), _x and _z can be rewritten as follows:
_x =
 
_c
c
 
_k
k
!
~x (A.15)
and
_z =
 
_G2
G2
 
_k
k
!
~z (A.16)
with _c
c
, _k
k
and _G2
G2
dened according to (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7). Saddlepoint
stability requires that the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of partial deriv-
atives of the dynamic system (A.14) must be negative:
det J = a11a22   a12a21 (A.17)
Given the complexity of the matrix, it is easier to verify numerically that
this condition holds. For most sensible examples with sensible parameter
values that we used, this condition is satised.
A.3 Uniqueness and Stability in Model 3 with CES
Technology
With x = c
k
, z = G2
k
and w = G1
G2
, the dynamics of the market economy can
be expressed as a system of three di¤erential equations:
_x
x
=
_c
c
 
_k
k
(A.18)
_z
z
=
_G2
G2
 
_k
k
(A.19)
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_w
w
=
_G1
G1
 
_G2
G2
(A.20)
From (26), w can be written as
w =
1
2
(A.21)
Therefore, as long as 1;2 are constant, _w = 0 and
_w
w
= 0. This means that
in terms of its dynamic properties, Model 3 is identical to Model 2, and it
can be shown in the same way as for Model 2 that Model 3 has likewise a
unique and saddlepath stable steady state equilibrium.
A.4 Business Perceptions of Public Spending-Related
Constraints with CES Technology
When the elasticity of substitution is smaller than in the case of Cobb-
Douglas technology ( < 0), there are mostly no closed-form solutions of
the growth-maximizing policies,   and . Therefore, this appendix eval-
uates the policy implications of 
B
1
B2
in Models 1, 2 and 3 using numerical
examples. Figure A.1 which refers to both, Models 1 and 3, conrms that
with  < 0, the policy implications of 
B
1
B2
are growth-enhancing when poli-
cies are not set at the growth maximum. In contrast, Figure A.2 provides a
numerical example with CES technology which shows that business percep-
tions of the public service- and public capital-related constraints in relation
to each other may be misleading (Model 2). Consider the case where 1 > 

1.
Figure A.2 shows that in this case, it is possible that 
B
1
B2
> 1 which suggests
increasing 1 even further.
A.5 The Ranking of Public Service- and Public Capital-
Related Constraints with CES Technology
This appendix presents numerical examples to analyze the likelihood that
B1 > 
B
2 in Model 2, namely that rms perceive public services as a greater
constraint than public capital, in analogy to Figure 1. In Figure A.3, the
production technology is CES (with  =  1) which requires that   0:3 in
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that in all regions, in all country income groups and under both survey in-
struments, taxation is always ranked as the most severe obstacle. Transport
is ranked last in four out of seven regions considered including Europe and
Central Asia. It is also ranked last across all country income groups except
in low income countries, and under both survey instruments.
Instead of considering mean ratings across rms, Table 6 presents the
shares of rms that rank taxation as the most or second most severe obsta-
cles and that rank transport as the least or second least obstacle, respectively.
Table 6 shows that in all subsamples considered, the vast majority of rms
ranks taxation rst or second, and that more than 50 percent of the rms
ranks transport last or second last, except in Subs-Saharan Africa and in
low income economies, where this share is slightly lower. We therefore con-
sider our results as robust in this respect. Finally, in Table 7, we omit the
education-related obstacle as education is sometimes privately provided, at
least partially. Qualitatively, the results are identical to Table 5.
Table 3: Dataset - overview
no. of countries no. of surveys % of rms
Geographical Region
East Asia and Pacic 16 23 12.0%
Europe and Central Asia 34 101 31.5%
Latin America and Caribbean 31 58 25.7%
Middle East and North Africa 10 10 4.0%
South Asia 7 12 10.1%
Sub-Saharan Africa 41 64 16.7%
Country income group
High income 23 47 18.0%
Low income 30 52 13.5%
Lower middle income 42 79 31.2%
Upper middle income 44 90 37.3%
Total
All 139 268 100.0%
Table 4: Countries and survey years
Country Years Income group
Afghanistan 2008 Low income
Albania 2002, 2005, 2007 Upper middle income
Algeria 2002 Upper middle income
Angola 2006, 2010 Upper middle income
Antigua and Barbuda 2010 High income
Argentina 2006, 2010 Upper middle income
Armenia 2002, 2005, 2009 Lower middle income
Azerbaijan 2002, 2005, 2009 Upper middle income
Bahamas 2010 High income
Bangladesh 2002, 2007 Low income
Barbados 2010 High income
Belarus 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013 Upper middle income
Belize 2010 Upper middle income
Benin 2004, 2009 Low income
Bhutan 2009 Lower middle income
Bolivia 2006, 2010 Lower middle income
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2002, 2005, 2009 Upper middle income
Botswana 2006, 2010 Upper middle income
Brazil 2003, 2009 Upper middle income
Bulgaria 2002, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009 Upper middle income
Burkina Faso 2006, 2009 Low income
Burundi 2006 Low income
Cambodia 2003 Low income
Cameroon 2006, 2009 Lower middle income
Cape Verde 2006, 2009 Lower middle income
Central African Republic 2011 Low income
Chad 2009 Low income
Chile 2004, 2006, 2010 High income
China 2002, 2012 Upper middle income
Colombia 2006, 2010 Upper middle income
Congo 2009 Lower middle income
Costa Rica 2005, 2010 Upper middle income
Cote dIvoire 2009 Lower middle income
Croatia 2002, 2005, 2007 High income
Czech Republic 2002, 2005, 2009 High income
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2006, 2010 Low income
Dominica 2010 Upper middle income
Dominican Republic 2005, 2010 Upper middle income
Ecuador 2003, 2006, 2010 Upper middle income
continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Country Years Income group
Egypt 2004 Lower middle income
El Salvador 2003, 2006, 2010 Lower middle income
Eritrea 2002, 2009 Low income
Estonia 2002, 2005, 2009 High income
Ethiopia 2002, 2011 Low income
Fiji 2009 Upper middle income
Gabon 2009 Upper middle income
Gambia 2006 Low income
Georgia 2002, 2005, 2008 Lower middle income
Germany 2005 High income
Ghana 2007 Lower middle income
Greece 2005 High income
Grenada 2010 Upper middle income
Guatemala 2003, 2006, 2010 Lower middle income
Guinea 2006 Low income
Guinea-Bissau 2006 Low income
Guyana 2004, 2010 Lower middle income
Honduras 2003, 2006, 2010 Lower middle income
Hungary 2002, 2005, 2009 Upper middle income
India 2002, 2006 Lower middle income
Indonesia 2003, 2009 Lower middle income
Iraq 2011 Upper middle income
Ireland 2005 High income
Jamaica 2005, 2010 Upper middle income
Jordan 2006 Upper middle income
Kazakhstan 2002, 2005, 2009 Upper middle income
Kenya 2003, 2007 Low income
Kosovo 2009 Lower middle income
Kyrgyz Republic 2002, 2003, 2005, 2009 Low income
Laos 2006, 2009, 2012 Lower middle income
Latvia 2002, 2005, 2009 High income
Lebanon 2006 Upper middle income
Lesotho 2003, 2009 Lower middle income
Liberia 2009 Low income
Lithuania 2002, 2004, 2005, 2009 High income
Macedonia 2002, 2005, 2009 Upper middle income
Madagascar 2005, 2009 Low income
Malawi 2005, 2009 Low income
Malaysia 2002 Upper middle income
Mali 2003, 2007, 2010 Low income
continued on next page . . .
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. . . continued from previous page
Country Years Income group
Mauritania 2006 Lower middle income
Mauritius 2005, 2009 Upper middle income
Mexico 2006, 2010 Upper middle income
Micronesia 2009 Lower middle income
Moldova 2002, 2003, 2005, 2009 Lower middle income
Mongolia 2004, 2009 Lower middle income
Montenegro 2003, 2009 Upper middle income
Morocco 2004 Lower middle income
Mozambique 2007 Low income
Namibia 2006 Upper middle income
Nepal 2009, 2013 Low income
Nicaragua 2003, 2006, 2010 Lower middle income
Niger 2005, 2009 Low income
Nigeria 2007 Lower middle income
Oman 2003 High income
Pakistan 2002, 2007 Lower middle income
Panama 2006, 2010 Upper middle income
Paraguay 2006, 2010 Lower middle income
Peru 2002, 2006, 2010 Upper middle income
Philippines 2003, 2009 Lower middle income
Poland 2002, 2003, 2005, 2009 High income
Portugal 2005 High income
Romania 2002, 2005, 2009 Upper middle income
Russia 2002, 2005, 2009, 2012 High income
Rwanda 2006, 2011 Low income
Saint Kitts and Nevis 2010 High income
Saint Lucia 2010 Upper middle income
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2010 Upper middle income
Samoa 2009 Lower middle income
Senegal 2003, 2007 Lower middle income
Sierra Leone 2009 Low income
Slovak Republic 2002, 2005, 2009 High income
Slovenia 2002, 2005, 2009 High income
South Africa 2003, 2007 Upper middle income
South Korea 2005 High income
Spain 2005 High income
Sri Lanka 2004, 2011 Lower middle income
Suriname 2010 Upper middle income
Swaziland 2006 Lower middle income
Syria 2003 Lower middle income
continued on next page . . .
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Country Years Income group
Tajikistan 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008 Low income
Tanzania 2003, 2006 Low income
Thailand 2004 Upper middle income
Timor 2009 Lower middle income
Togo 2009 Low income
Tonga 2009 Upper middle income
Trinidad and Tobago 2010 High income
Turkey 2002, 2004, 2005, 2008 Upper middle income
Uganda 2003, 2006 Low income
Ukraine 2002, 2005, 2008 Lower middle income
Uruguay 2006, 2010 High income
Uzbekistan 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008 Lower middle income
Vanuatu 2009 Lower middle income
Venezuela 2006, 2010 Upper middle income
Vietnam 2005, 2009 Lower middle income
Westbank and Gaza 2006 Lower middle income
Yemen 2010 Lower middle income
Yugoslavia 2002, 2003, 2005, 2009 Upper middle income
Zambia 2002, 2007 Lower middle income
Zimbabwe 2011 Low income
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Table 5: Ranking of the obstacles - robustness
Taxation Tax administration Skills Crime Transport
Geographical Region
East Asia and Pacic 1.12 0.90 1.27 0.80 0.91
Europe and Central Asia 1.66 1.08 0.96 0.74 0.54
Latin America and Caribbean 1.14 0.92 1.11 1.08 0.75
Middle East and North Africa 1.49 1.12 0.95 0.71 0.56
South Asia 1.26 1.10 0.91 0.87 0.84
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.27 0.93 0.78 1.06 0.96
Country income group
High income 1.61 0.96 1.11 0.72 0.61
Upper middle income 1.31 1.00 1.09 0.94 0.66
Lower middle income 1.26 0.98 0.93 0.98 0.83
Low income 1.32 1.08 0.78 0.88 0.93
Survey instrument
Old 1.45 1.14 0.97 0.85 0.58
New 1.28 0.90 1.02 0.94 0.85
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Table 6: Ranking of the obstacles - robustness
% of rms that rank % of rms that rank
taxation rst or second transport last or second last
Geographical Region
East Asia and Pacic 85.2% 55.6%
Europe and Central Asia 92.4% 66.8%
Latin America and Caribbean 81.5% 58.4%
Middle East and North Africa 92.2% 58.3%
South Asia 84.3% 52.5%
Sub-Saharan Africa 82.6% 45.1%
Country income group
High income 90.6% 63.8%
Upper middle income 86.8% 61.8%
Lower middle income 83.8% 55.2%
Low income 84.7% 45.6%
Survey instrument
Old 89.1% 66.1%
New 84.3% 52.2%
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Table 7: Ranking of the obstacles (education-related obstacle omitted)
Taxation Tax administration Crime Transport
Geographical Region
East Asia and Pacic 1.18 0.96 0.87 0.99
Europe and Central Asia 1.64 1.06 0.75 0.54
Latin America and Caribbean 1.17 0.94 1.12 0.77
Middle East and North Africa 1.46 1.10 0.72 0.57
South Asia 1.22 1.07 0.86 0.84
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.19 0.87 1.02 0.92
Country income group
High income 1.61 0.96 0.72 0.61
Upper middle income 1.31 1.00 0.94 0.66
Lower middle income 1.26 0.98 0.98 0.83
Low income 1.32 1.08 0.88 0.93
Survey instrument
Old 1.45 1.14 0.85 0.58
New 1.28 0.90 0.94 0.85
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